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AssocIate Professor of Hi~tory
For almost two years now the whole
world has been watching with fascination
the development of the present crisis in
Poland that was preceded by economic
difficulties brought about by Premier
Edward Gierek's economic program.!
Gierek attempted to revitalize the Polish
economy and modernize Polish industry
by borrowing heavily from the West in
order to pay for more advanced western
technology. His initial plan seemed viable;
however, it failed largely because of the
mismanagement and the corruptive
practices of the party's bureaucrats.2
Consequently, as a result of the growing
indebtedness to the West, Poland had to
increase its exports at the expense of
domestic markets, and this led to a rapid
decline of the standard of living.3 It was
under these circumstances that the strike
in Gdansk began.4
Initially the strikers demanded the
formation of trade unions free of
governmental controls, the right to strike,
freedom of the press, free Saturdays, and
the resolution of a number of specific
grievances.s Faced with a general strike,
the government gave in to most of these
IZ. M. Fallenbuchl, Po/ityka
gospodarcza PRL (London, 1980),
passim.; Z. M. F., "Les changements
recents dans la structure industrielle et
leur impact sur Ie potentiel d'exportation
de pays du CAEM dans Ie commerce Est-
Ouest," Revue d'etudes comparatives
Est-Ouest, 1979, 10(4): 91-115.
2"East European Economic
Assessment," Joint Economic Committee
of the U. S. Congress, Washington, 1980.
3Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Pozyczki
zachodnie dla PRL," Kultura, 1980,
399(12): 55-66; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, vol.
289, December 24, 1981.
4"Kalendarium strajku w Gdansku,"
Kultura,1980, 397(10): 66-75; The Strike in
Gdansk (New Haven, 1981), passim.;
Polski Sierpien 1980 (New York, 1981),
pp.9-44.
SStrike in Gdansk, pp. 21-23.
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demands; and within a few months most
of the working population of Poland
joined the new union, which was named
So/idarnosc (Solidarity).
Confronted by a nation united under
one banner, the regime promised to
introduce large-scale reforms, which were
to be carried out in close cooperation
with Solidarity and other segments of
Polish society.6 But this apparent
capitulation of a ruling Communist Party
was only illusory, and the Polish
experiment in democracy ended in a
tragedy. On December 12, 1981, a
military junta, led by General Wojciech
Jaruzelski, declared a martial law across
Poland.7
At present there does not seem to 'be a
bright prospect for a peaceful and an
amicable resolution of the problem. Just
as before, the future course of the events
in Poland will be influenced decisively by
the Soviet Union. Here, looking into the
crystal ball of the future, we can only be
guided by the pattern of past Soviet
behavior and by their official and
unofficial pronouncements on the subject.
On the basis of this kind of evidence one
can point to a development in Moscow of
a "maximalist" stand on the Polish
question. It became apparent that from
the very beginning the Soviets, following
the teachings of Lenin, viewed the
existence of free trade unions in a
socialist state as an unacceptable
aberration. They argued that in a socialist
system, unions can exist only as a part of
the state administration, and under strong
party control. Moreover, Solidarity's
demand that Polish industry be placed
under the union's control and
management was viewed as a return to
6"Protokol porozumienia zawartego
przez Komisje Rzadowa i
Miedzyzakladowy Komited Strajkowy, 31
sierpnia 1980 r., "Kultura", 1980, 397(10):
158-166.
7Newsweek, December 28, 1981.
the position condemned by Lenin
himself.8
Starting from this Leninist premise,
Russian Party Secretary, Mikhail Suslov's
hardliners in Moscow encouraged the
pro-Soviet faction of the Polish
Communist Party to sabotage the
reforms. They hoped that it would
intensify the radicalization process in
Poland, and that the ensuing tensions
would create more favorable conditions
under which a military putsch by native
Polish forces would be feasible. It seems
that such an "invasion from within"
looked more advantageous to them than
the alternative of a direct intervention by
the Soviet Army. Furthermore, the
"suslovites" seemed to perceive the
situation in Poland as a possible blessing
in disguise; evidently, they think that it
can provide an opportunity to rectify the
"fundamental errors", which they believe
existed in Poland ever since 1948. And to
make the point clear, they emphasize that
the difficulties which Poland faced were
not caused by the socialist system, but by
Polish deviations from the principles
prescribed by the theories of Marx and
Lenin.9 To the Russians, the existence in
Poland of private farms, the lack of wide-
scale collectivization, the presence of a
powerful church, and the existence of
some bourgeois freedoms indicated that
the poles deviated from the Soviet model,
which is the only model acceptable to the
Suslov hardliners. lO Furthermore, after
former Polish party leader Stanislaw
Kania's speech at the Polish Party
Congress in July of 1981, Suslov's
"maximalists" became convinced that the
Polish Party is unreliable: It deviated
dangerously from the prescribed ideology,
and it was ready to abandon the pinciple
of "socialist centralism" under which the
8Pravda, September 5, 1980; Pravda
October 5, 1980.
9Pravda, July 17, 1981.
IOLiternaya Gazeta, May 6 and May 13,
1981.
CULTURAL COMMENTARY
Assumption College Conference on Les Petits Canadas de la Nouvelle Angleterre, held on March
14, 1982. Left to right - Professor John Myers, Professor Philip Silvia, Mr. Ronald Petrin, and
Professor Stanley Hamilton.
Our Strengthened Ties To Quebec
nation. Our undergraduate can sample
the eternal debate on anglophone (mostly
American) domination of Canada's
mineral wealth and our pervasive grip on
the arts in Canada. The particular
advantage of the Quebec program is that
one lives in a "foreign" environment
where one can survive reasonably well
without native command of the local
language or even without any familiarity
with local language. An advantage of
equal importance in the 1980's is that
even a rudimentary language skill can
develop into a vehicle for understanding
the cultural strife that currently fires
political and social debate in Quebec.
This recent agreement is only one more
example of the close ties between Canada
and BSe. The Canadian government
currently uses the Maxwell Library as an
official selected document depository, a
service which BSC alone enjoys among
Massachusetts State Colleges. The
National Film Board of Canada provides
films for BSC French courses and the
Quebec Province Ministry of
Intergovernmental Affairs furnishes
materials for our Canadian Studies Office
and speakers for BSC classes. Most
recently, the Quebec Ministry partially
funded Professor Stanley Hamilton's
sabbactical leave to research the contem-
porary French Canadian novel.
The BSC Canadian Studies Program,
chaired by Professor John Myers of the
History Department, provides a range of
interdisciplinary courses to undergraduate
and graduate students. Members of the
program are active in a variety of
professional conferences in the field. For
example, Professor Philip Silvia presented
a paper entitled "Neighbors from the
The value of residence in a foreign
country received amusing testimony in an
exchange overheard in front of Fanueil
Hall on Patriot's Day. A preppy
undergraduate asked his Scandinavian
guest of the same age: "Do you have fried
bread in Sweden?" The American mayor
may not have known that his fried bread
has its origin in Navajo culinary tradition,
a heritage that our forbearers did their
best to eradicate during a painful
conquest of the American Southwest.
The Swedish guest mayor may not have
recognized the resemblance of the friend's
bread to the pastry served in his country,
and elsewhere in Europe as well. Eating
habits rank among the most interesting
but commonplace points of comparison
when two cultures come into daily
association.
Contact between the two cultures
involves the trivial and the momentous,
however, as BSC students will learn when
they participate in the Quebec Exchange
Program offered next year for the first
time. Ties between BSC and the Quebec
Province were strengthened by the recent
signing of a reciprocal agreement that
provides for student exchanges among
nine Quebec institutions and twenty-three
colleges and universities in New England.
Under the terms of the accord, a BSC
student pays BSC tuition, and, other
expenses would be comparable to those
on our own campus. Signatories
encourage students from all disciplines to
apply for the exchange.
The academic attractions of a Quebec
sojourn span a range of issues that stem
from a colonized people's effort to retain
ethnic identity amidst vast socializing
forces set in nlotion by the colonizing
llPravda, October 7, 1981; L'Unita,
September 10, 1981.
12Krasnaya Zviezda, January 13, 1982.
13M. K. Dziewanowski, The Communist
Party in Poland (Cambridge, 1959), pp.
149-150. .
Party, the State, and the Society were to
be directly controlled by the party
leadership. 11
Apparently, Suslov believed that under
the conditions developing in Poland these
Nfundamental errorsNcan be reversed.
But drastic changes of this kind could not
be carried out by a divided and unreliable
party that was unable to control its own
members. At this point, Suslov and his
followers were convinced that the only
reliable force in Poland, on which the
Soviet Union could depend, was the
Secret Police and the higher echelons of
the Polish army.12
One might prognosticate that if the
hardliners win the upper hand in Moscow,
the present military junta in Poland might
be used to purge completely the existing
Party and replace it with a new party
along the lines of Marxist-Leninist model
identical with that of the Soviet Union. A
large and radical purge of this sort would
not be strange to the Soviet experience,
and it would probably be even more
bloody than the one accompanying
Stalin's dissolution of the Polish
Communist party in 1938. 13 But a drastic
change like this would initiate a new era
of Stalinism within the Soviet empire
which might have an adverse effect on
the relations between the two super
powers. Of course, there is always the
outside chance that the present military
regime in Poland might find a modus
vivendi to defuse the existing conflict
between itself and the Polish people, and
to restore some resemblance of political
and economic stability. But in this
respect, the Western response to the
Polish crisis is of crucial importance: How
the West reacts to it will probably
determine the nature of its relations with
the Soviet world for a generation to
come. Here, one can make a strong case
for the argument that if the West
continues to respond to the Polish crisis
as it did to the Afghanistan affair, the
long-term consequences of "doing
business as usual" might be detrimental to
its own self-interest, and it could
contribute to further destabilization of"
Eastern Europe that might be prejudicial
to the general peace.
Poland ... continued
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